Abstract: Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) can be characterized as those systems for which no model less complex than the system itself can accurately predict in detail how the system will behave at future times. Consequently, the standard tools of policy analysis, based as they are on devising policies that perform well on some best estimate model of the system, cannot be reliably used for CAS. This paper argues that policy analysis for CAS requires an alternative approach to decision theory. The general characteristics of such an approach are described, and examples provided of its application to policy analysis.
I. Introduction -The Need for New Tools
Quantitative policy analysis depends upon a portfolio of tools that have been drawn from a variety of disciplines, including Game Theory, Economics, Statistical Decision theory, and Operations Research. These tools are rigorous and sophisticated, and have proven their value on a host of policy problems spanning several decades of research. To date however, there are few good examples of the classical policy analysis tools being successfully used for a complete policy analysis of a problem where complexity and adaptation are central. Indeed, there are a sufficient number of examples of misleading analyses resulting from the naïve application of these approaches to complex systems to suggest that there may be something fundamentally different about CAS that requires new tools. This paper argues that the central feature of the classical tools that lead to difficulty is the identification of a single "best" model of the system of interest, followed by the use of that model to develop a policy that is "best" in the context of that model. Typically, the best policy is one that optimizes some cost or utility function for that model. While this meta-technique is so ubiquitous that is may seem unavoidable, its justification is difficult when applied to complex systems. Any system whose behavior is well captured by some model, cannot be a CAS, by most definitions. This is best seen by realizing that CASs have perpetual novelty among their important attributes. Possession of an accurate model insures no surprises, and hence, no complexity.
If we take as our definition of a CAS the proposition that no model can accurately predict the details of system behavior, then approaches to policy analysis based on using some model to forecast system behavior will be inappropriate for CAS, not matter how well that model is crafted. Policies that are optimal for some best estimate model, may under-perform very badly in some regimes of behavior of the actual system not captured by the model. That is to say, optimal policies for best estimate models may not be robust across the range of possible behaviors of the complex adaptive system. More subtly, for complex adaptive systems, single models will frequent fail to exploit important knowledge that is available, and could be used to help craft good policies. This very important fact is a consequence of yet another aspect of complex adaptive systems, known as "Deep Uncertainty".
II. Deep Uncertainty
Divergence between the detailed behavior of systems and the predictions of best estimate models is not unique to complex adaptive systems. In what I am calling "classical" policy analysis, (or for that matter classical science) this difference is known as "uncertainty", and is addressed using the tools of probability, statistics, and statistical decision theory. If the tools of statistical modeling and analysis are adequate to meet that challenge posed by CAS, then there is not need for new concepts or new tools. This is equivalent to the view that the sciences of complexity provide no new insights over those of traditional science, and is held by more than a few scientists.
There is of course another view. Arguments for the importance of complexity science have been voiced elsewhere, and I will not repeat them here. A similar but different argument can be framed in the language of uncertainty analysis. In that language, the claim that complexity science introduces something new is equivalent to saying that there are phenomena that are prosaically described as uncertain that are not well modeled by the tools of probability and statistics. The term I use to describe such phenomena is "Deep Uncertainty"
1 . The view of classical science (and most statisticians) is that no such thing as deep uncertainty exists. The experience of decades of practical experience suggests otherwise.
In my view, deep uncertainty is important not because some yet to be discovered theorem invalidates or extends probability and statistics in some fundamental (reductionist) way. Instead, I believe that deep uncertainty is the result of pragmatic limitations in our ability to use the representational formalisms of statistical decision theory to express all that we know about complex adaptive systems and their associated policy problems. The familiar tools are adequate for complicated systems that are relatively predictable (i.e. for computer assisted design) or are uncertain but relatively simple (as in the relatively low dimensionality of most statistical models). But there are huge pragmatic barriers in actually applying these formalisms to problems that combine complexity with uncertainty (especially that very non-linear source of uncertain created by interacting adaptive agents). It is for these problems, those related to complex adaptive systems, that new tools are most needed.
There are several reasons that the tools of probability in statistics that can in principle represent all knowledge about any problem do not suffice for many real problems. These can be grouped into two main categories. First, the representations of probability and statistics often provide a poor ontology for capturing our knowledge about complex and adaptive systems, requiring that different representations be employed if we are to utilize all our knowledge. Second, the rationalist assumptions that motivate the representational choices of probability and statistics are in conflict with the pragmatics of many policy contexts, requiring that something outside of probabilistic approaches be employed to deal with the deep uncertainty arising out of those practical realities.
III. New Tools for Reasoning about Complex Adaptive Systems
Eventually, a new framework for decision theory appropriate to CAS may be erected. Various initial steps in that direction have been made (see for example, [1] ). The most significant accomplishment of the last decade, however, has been the innovation of new computational approaches to devising robust policies for complex adaptive systems. In the remainder of this paper I will present several of the innovations that I believe are most fundamental and important. I have little doubt that a much longer list will be developed in the coming decade.
IV. Reasoning with Ensembles
Best estimate models are constructed using available knowledge about the system of interest. When such a model does not predict that behavior of a system, it often true that there is additional information available about the system that was not used in constructing the model. Often, more information can be captured in an ensemble of alternative plausible models than can be captured by any individual model. Indeed, probability distributions are a representation of just such an ensemble. But, the restrictions that are imposed by the mathematical formalisms of probability theory can now be avoided by a combination of explicit enumeration of finite lists of alternative options and inductive reasoning about the properties of infinite ensembles represented with generative techniques. Computational tools enabling facile manipulation of ensembles of models provide an important approach to dealing with the ontology of deep uncertainty. Unexpectedly (by me at least), they also have provided an important foundation for addressing the pragmatics of deep uncertainty as well. This computational approach (referred to in some literatures as exploratory modeling or exploratory analysis) allows human analysts and decision makers to be interactively involved in selecting among alternative options during the course of an analysis. Rationalist frameworks like that of statistical decision theory require all knowledge to be acquired before the analysis can begin, which translates into major barrier to utilizing the qualitative and tacit knowledge held by humans and their organizations. Exploratory modeling allows such knowledge to emerge and be used throughout the course of an iterative analytic process. Consequently, it can provide a bridge for moving from deductive, reductionist analysis of closed systems, to interactive analytic support for inductive reasoning about open systems where the contextual pragmatic knowledge possessed by users can be integrated with quantitative data residing in the computer. (see [1] and [9] .) Technology for manipulating ensembles can be applied to representing ensembles of alternative models, and also to ensembles of plausible futures, and for ensembles of candidate (satisficing) policies. This technology is used for all of the following techniques.
V. Policy Landscapes
Naive policy analysis of CAS uses models as closed systems to produce point forecasts, either a single vector of outputs, or a single probability. For complex adaptive systems, especially those that are open, no such modeling exercise can be viewed as final and definitive. Instead, any calculation, including those that integrate over probabilistic representations, must be subjected to robustness testing. That is to say, the impact on policy conclusions of alternative modeling choices must be examined. The goal is to discover a policy recommendation that holds for all conceivable. Frequently, and especially in the face of deep uncertainty, alternative assumptions can lead to different outcomes. Rather than hide from this common situation, we can exploit this intermediate outcome to deepen our knowledge of the problem and exploit the not yet utilized tacit knowledgeable of humans experts. Graphical depictions of the pattern of outcomes across a range of alternative assumptions can provide a significant improvement over point predictions, even those with accompanying sensitivity analysis. Figure 1 motivates the use of this technique. This example is based on a model developed by a major oil company to forecast the price of oil. The model contains a great deal of class knowledge that ideally should help with a variety of important decisions, such as investing in the construction of a new refinery. However, when the model is used as a prediction engine, very little benefit is derived, as figure 1a demonstrates. A single, best estimate price path provides little help in making any decision, as both the model builder and the analysis consumer know that this "prediction" is nearly certain not to be correct. Indeed, this best estimate, made in 1997, can now be seen retrospectively to have matched the actual price of oil very poorly indeed. The situation would be no different if we did a retrospective of the predictions of combat models of the casualties in the Gulf War, or macroeconomic models prediction of GDP for more than a few quarters into the future. However, this output still greatly underestimates the actual uncertainty facing the decision maker. For this Monte Carlo simulation was done by varying quantitative parameters for which probabilities could be easily estimated. For this problem (and others characterized by deep uncertainty) there are a host of structural or model uncertainties that are much more difficult to suggest good probability distributions for. Similarly, a variety of exogenous events could occur that would greatly effect the price of oil. Figure 1c shows the result of one such excursion, where the new oil fields in former Soviet republics are assumed to come on the market more rapidly than was estimated in the baseline model. This is but an example of such a plausible alternative future. Others include a collapse in the third world economies, and along with it the demand for oil, or a revolution in the Middle East that interrupted the production of oil.
All of these issues could, in theory, be handled by the probabalistic machinery of statistical modeling. However, the pragmatics of very complex real world systems is such that this is essentially never done for real problems. Instead, invariably the rhetoric of prediction (including probabilistic prediction) gets used, even when these predictions are suspect. Curves such as fig. 1c are seldom produced and the set of all such possible graphs seldom considered, because the conclusion is readily drawn that we really have no idea what the price of oil will be in 10 years. And without some sort of forecast, what use is a model of the price of oil? For that matter, what use is any model of a complex system, whose predictions do not come true?
Figure 1: Predictions versus Policy Landscapes
One simple answer is provided in figure 1d . While a wide range of oil prices are possible, there is structure in the ensemble of plausible scenarios that generates that price range. And that structure, properly organized and graphically portrayed, can support the reasoning of the analyst or decision maker. In figure 1d is portrayed the rate of return of a notional investment whose performance is tied to the price of oil. This performance is color coded based on the natural non-linearity of the corporate standard hurdle rate for viewing investments as attractive. This two dimensional picture is a slice through a multidimensional landscape of possible excursions. The position and orientation of the 
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slice can be interactively controlled by the user, allowing the pattern of outcomes across a multidimensional scenario space to be examined.
VI. Level Sets of Satisfactory Solutions
Just as no single model can capture all the knowledge that may be available for a complex adaptive system, no single policy recommendation, calculated to optimize a cost function on that model, does either. And for policy analysis, a policy recommendation is not just a mechanical control, it conveys information which is then utilized human beings.
An alternative to single policies is to provide decision makers with ensembles of policy options. Such an ensemble can be a level set of policies that perform better than some threshold on a cost function. This approach can provide much better support for satisficing decision strategies that are commonly used be real decision makers. An example is shown in figure 2 . This figure is drawn from work done on the deep attack weapons mix problem [3] . The task is to select a portfolio of deep attack weapons to be procured in preparation for some future conflict. What is often done is to use a high resolution simulation of such a conflict, and to search for the optimum portfolio of weapons to achieve combat goals in that simulation. In this example the model CTEM was used, and the resulting optimum portfolio was a mix of three weapon systems, shown as the white circle at the bottom of the diagram. This single point provides poor support for humans who have knowledge the model does not, to use their insight and contextual knowledge to utilize model outputs. Much better information is provided by the level set of weapons mixes that come within 5% of the performance of that optimal portfolio. The resulting boomerang shaped level set clearly shows the complementarity of the two weapons type whose numbers make up the axes of the graph. Contrast the level set of satisfactory policies to the "take it of leave it" single optimal policy recommendation. Note that the level set provides experts with much more information about the pattern of model performance as policies vary. Using this format for the output of an analysis provides decision makers an opportunity to exploit the qualitative contextual knowledge they possess that is not incorporated into the model in picking a final policy option out of the ensemble of alternatives.
VII. Robust Strategies
A level set provides much more information than does a single optimal policy. Combining this idea with that of policy landscapes, the computer can be used to discover policies that are robust across multiple scenarios or alternative models, and to identify and graphically depict sets of policies with satisfactory robustness.
One way to do this is to intersect a finite number of level sets created with different models or different scenarios or assumptions. One can also calculate a robustness metric, such as regret [8] figure 3 . This is drawn from a study of e-commerce strategy [5] . 
VIII. Adaptive Strategies
Successful policies for complex, adaptive systems will typically need to be adaptive themselves. But, single forecasting models combined with optimization to craft policies, results in static policies that always make the correct move for that best estimate model. In order to test adaptive policies, a challenge set of possible future situations is needed, and the ensembles of alternative models being used for all of the previous techniques is perfect for this. Similarly, adaptive policies need to be evaluated on their robustness properties, not on their performance on any single case. So, all of the previous tools and techniques serve to lay a foundation on which adaptive policies can be crafted. Under emphasized above, but crucial to creating useful adaptive strategies, is the use of the computer to find important scenarios, in particular cases that break a proposed policy. This combined with the use of policy landscapes to inform users of which candidate policies perform well for which cases, can allow users to iterate with the computer to gradually evolve policy schemas that have instances with desirable properties.
The best examples of this approach come from the climate literature and the work of Lempert and his colleagues [2, 6, 7] .
IX. Conclusions
While complex adaptive systems originally seemed to pose a problem for policy analysis, they may also present an opportunity. The failure of computerized decision support systems to provide significant help for most problems is striking when contrasted to the impact of computer technology in other spheres. Looking back we can now see that most policy problems involve complex and adaptive systems, and that for those problems the classical approaches of predictive modeling and optimization that have been used in decision support software are not appropriate. The next stage in the development of complexity science could well include a reformulation of decision theory and the emergence of the first really useful computer assisted reasoning for policy analysis.
